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Ireland will have a second referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. There is 
now a distinct probability that the Irish will vote “Yes” after all. But what 
happens then? European policymakers, in the light of the forthcoming 
European elections, should first take to heart five lessons distilled from 
the debate about the treaty. 
 
The Irish government took a long time to 
reach this decision. In fact, it had origi-
nally intended to present its plans for a 
solution to the ratification dilemma at the 
October summit of the European heads of 
state and government. It has taken another 
two months of cogitation and tactical 
evaluation, but apparently it has been 
worth waiting for.  
 
There is now a distinct probability that the 
Irish electorate will decide in favour of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in a second referendum. 
In times of economic uncertainty Europe is 
closing ranks. More than anyone else, the 
Irish, seeing that their economy heavily 
depends on foreign direct investment, are 
hoping that the EU will help to stabilize 
the situation in the current global finan-
cial and economic turmoil. 
I 
Support from the  
Electorate 
The public debate in recent years through-
out the length and breadth of Europe gave 
the impression the electorate was gener-
ally sceptical about the European project. 
What has been dubbed the “enlargement 
hang-over” after the accession of first ten 
and then of another two new member 
states, the French and Dutch “No” vote on 
the European Constitution, and finally the 
Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon en-
sured that there was smouldering and, so 
it seemed, growing criticism of Europe. 
From such scepticism about the direction 
of EU policymaking it was only a small 
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step to a general rejection of the European 
Union. 
 
Opinion polls are now telling a different 
story. If citizens are given a choice bet-
ween their member state staying in the EU 
or leaving, the vast majority are totally 
against leaving. 81 per cent of the French, 
83 per cent of the Poles and 86 per cent of 
the Germans want their countries to re-
main in the European Union. In Austria, 
where the government broke apart a few 
months ago on account of disagreements 
about future policy towards Europe, only 
17 per cent were in favour of leaving the 
EU. Even in the United Kingdom, which 
continues to be the most eurosceptical 
country of them all, only 32 per cent are in 
favour of leaving the EU, whereas 59 per 
cent of the British would like to remain in 
the EU. 
 
Most surprisingly, perhaps, 92 per cent of 
the Irish, whose “No” vote on the Treaty of 
Lisbon caused profound depression to de-
scend on Europe’s political elite, would 
like to remain in the EU. A mere 5 per 
cent of the Irish want their country to 
leave the EU. 
 
One could probably go through the EU 
country by country. If they were asked to 
choose, citizens everywhere would say 
that they are in favour of remaining in the 
Union. This shows that specific objections 
levelled at a certain EU project should not 
be construed as blanket criticism of the 
EU. It is a tendency which has become 
rather common among politicians and in 
the media in recent years. 
 
Even among those who want their country 
to leave the EU, only a small proportion 
agreed with the statement that the EU had 
fulfilled its purpose and was no longer 
needed. Furthermore, the main criticism of 
these opponents of the EU is not the lack 
of EU democracy, but the disproportionate 
intrusion of the Union in the political af-
fairs of individual member states.  
It is worth mentioning that among the op-
ponents of the EU the number of British 
interviewees who criticized the EU for 
providing insufficient social security for 
its citizens exceeded the number of French 
interviewees who made similar comments. 
Today French citizens, more than two 
years after their rejection of the European 
constitution, no longer consider the Euro-
pean Union to be a problem. 
 
II 
Irish Prospects 
The EU summit on 11 and 12 December 
came up with a compromise that makes it 
possible for the Irish government to em-
bark on a second (and hopefully success-
ful) referendum. The basis for this is that 
Ireland, like all the other member states, 
will be allowed to keep its EU commis-
sioner, and the erstwhile plans for a re-
duction in the size of the Commission will 
be scrapped. The Irish electorate will be 
presented with the original text of the  
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treaty, though this time with certain decla-
rations by the Irish government which 
emphasize national sovereignty with re-
gard to issues that are sensitive ones in 
Ireland. In this way the Irish government 
might be able to neutralize the scepticism 
of the electorate, which was pinpointed in 
a post-referendum opinion poll. For exam-
ple, Irish citizens were afraid that 
they might be called up to serve in a 
European army, or that there might 
be a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which conferred too much power on 
the European Court of Justice.  
 
Current opinion polls in Ireland 
suggest that the Irish could now 
vote in favour of the Treaty of Lis-
bon provided that Ireland (like every 
other member state) retains its com-
missioner, that the military neutral-
ity of the country is emphasized in a 
separate declaration, and that na-
tional sovereignty is retained in 
questions relating to corporate taxa-
tion and abortion laws. Yet the poll 
data relating to what is evidently a 
change in the basic mood of the 
Irish population are no more than a 
hopeful sign. Before the first refer-
endum on the Treaty of Lisbon it 
seemed for a long time as if the vote 
would not pose a serious problem. 
 
Over and above these predictions it 
is of some interest to examine the 
intra-Irish decision-making. The po-
sition of the Irish government at the 
EU was based on a report on “Ire-
land’s future in the European Union” 
prepared by the Irish parliament. 
This report is not entirely free of the 
usual pro-European clichés, but for 
long stretches, as Hugo Brady has 
remarked, it is impressively lucid 
and thoughtful. The Sub-Committee 
on Ireland's future in the European Union 
dealt not only with the finer technical 
points of the ratification procedure, but in 
more general terms with the role and the 
position of the Republic of Ireland in the 
European Union. Among other things, the 
Sub-committee came to the following con-
clusions. 
 
•  Ireland’s standing and influence in the 
European Union have diminished following 
the people’s decision not to ratify the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
•  It is legally possible for the Union to 
stand still, though politically this seems 
unlikely. It is more likely that a mecha-
nism will be developed by other member 
states which allows them to proceed with a 
process of further integration which ex-
cludes Ireland.  
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•  The danger that Ireland will no longer 
belong to the inner core of the EU would 
seem to be a realistic prospect if it does 
not ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
•  Opt outs in EU policy areas, such as 
those secured by Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in the past, can have a detrimen-
tal effect. The Danish experience in par-
ticular shows that it minimizes the ability 
to shape and influence policy. The Sub-
committee came to the conclusion that 
“opt outs are not cost free.” 
“Small countries of the EU 
are under pressure.” 
There is a great deal of fear among the 
Irish political elite that the electorate will 
once again reject the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Even greater is the fear that Ireland will 
become an unimportant and marginalized 
actor in the process of European integra-
tion – with unpredictable consequences. In 
the daily political life of the EU small 
countries are compelled to outline their 
positions at an early stage and look for 
possible coalition partners. Yet pro-
integration countries will be very sceptical 
about Irish proposals of any kind if Ireland 
fails to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Economic consequences are also being 
discussed in Ireland. For example, in the 
current turmoil isolation might mean that 
Irish banks would find it even more diffi-
cult to obtain money on the international 
markets. Foreign investors are perturbed 
by the uncertain political situation, but 
have faith in the foresight and the good 
sense of the Irish electorate with regard to 
EU issues. The nervous debate in the Irish 
business community also demonstrates 
that the widespread belief among euro-
sceptics that it is possible to enjoy the 
economic advantages of EU integration 
without having to support political com-
munitarization or closer coordination is no 
more than a figment of the imagination. 
 
At any rate the alarmism of the parliamen-
tary Sub-committee demonstrates that 
smaller EU countries come under very 
great pressure if they fail to ratify treaties. 
It is a fact that the “No” vote of the French 
and the Dutch on the European constitu-
tion was accepted by the pro-European 
elite in quite a sympathetic manner. The 
Irish, possibly because they are among 
those who have benefited most from inte-
gration, were told on a number of occa-
sions that their behaviour was detrimental 
to the process of European unification.  
 
Not all of the member states are equal 
when it comes to the question of who is 
permitted to resist the will of the Euro-
pean majority (and how often). Smaller 
member states who did not help to shape 
the European Community from the very 
beginning are not in a very strong posi-
tion. This fundamental attitude helps to 
explain the reaction (which was immedi-
ately retracted) of German foreign minis-
ter Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who, shortly 
after the first Irish referendum, said it 
would also have to be seen how one could 
move forward without Ireland. 
 
III 
And what happens next? 
Trouble is still brewing in the Czech Re-
public. It is true that the Czech constitu-
tional court has removed the obstacles 
standing in the way of parliamentary rati-
fication of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, 
constitutional legality has been confirmed 
merely with regard to those parts of the 
treaty that the plaintiffs had called into 
question. Other submissions are still pos-
sible. 
 
On the governmental level the Czech 
Prime Minister Topolánek has been 
strengthened by his re-election as leader 
of the conservative ODS party. Yet in his 
party, despite all its protestations of unity, 
the supporters and opponents of the 
Treaty of Lisbon continue to hold diametri-
cally opposed views. The parliamentary 
decision will not be made before February 
2009. In any case President Klaus has al- 
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ready announced that he will take his time 
when it comes to signing the instruments 
of ratification. Czech lawyers disagree 
about whether or not the signature of the 
president is of decisive importance in legal 
terms. The Czech debate about the Treaty 
of Lisbon has not yet come to an end. The 
story continues next year. 
It is rather unlikely that the second Irish 
referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon will 
take place before the European elections. 
Members of the European Parliament have 
said on a number of occasions that it is 
important to hold the referendum actually 
before the elections.  
 
The European Parliament would have 
benefited a great deal from the new treaty. 
Thus the co-decision procedure would have 
been extended to 95 per cent of European 
legislation, the President of the Commis-
sion would have been elected by the Par-
liament, and in future it would have been 
obliged to give its assent to the EU budget. 
 
There is another reason why the Parlia-
ment is interested in speedy ratification. 
The provisions of the Treaty of Nice, which 
remains in force for the time being, stipu-
late that the European Parliament will 
have to be reduced in size, more than un-
der the Treaty of Lisbon. At the moment 
the Parliament has 785 MEPs. Lisbon 
would give it 751, and Nice envisages no 
more than 736. This reduction affects a to-
tal of twelve countries. 
 
EU citizens will find it rather difficult to 
understand the institutional situation of 
the EU in 2009. It will have a Treaty of 
Nice which continues to be in force. It will 
also have a Treaty of Lisbon, which, it is 
true, has been ratified by 23 countries, 
though it will first come into force, if at 
all, in 2010. And European elections of 
which a few months ago only sixteen per 
cent of EU citizens knew that they were to 
be held in 2009.  
 
The Swedish Minister for European Union 
Affairs, Malmström, fears that the 
“institutional limbo” could lead to a re-
newed bout of euroscepticism among EU 
citizens. This is not as far-fetched as it 
might seem. For this reason the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers have concluded 
inter-institutional agreements on new 
communication campaigns in order to get 
across what they believe are the facts 
about the EU. Is this likely to prove a suc-
cess in the run-up to the European elec-
tions? 
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IV 
The European Elections 
Campaign 
The supporters of European integration, 
that is, the vast majority of the political 
establishment in Strasbourg, Brussels and 
the EU member states, should deduce five 
lessons for the forthcoming European elec-
tion campaign from the “constitutional 
treaty turmoil” and the debates in recent 
months after the debacle of the Irish “No” 
vote. 
 
First, the EU has a problem with younger 
people, and not with the older generation. 
In Ireland the Treaty of Lisbon was re-
jected primarily by women and young vot-
ers. Thus 65 per cent of the 18-24-year-
olds and 59 per cent of the 25-39-year-olds 
voted  “No” at the first referendum. The 
Irish experience could no doubt be repli-
cated in numerous member states, particu-
larly in Western Europe. 
“The ‘Yes’ camp must  
improve its campaign.” 
However, most of the members of the 
younger generation are certainly not euro-
sceptical. The opposite is the case. They 
(and not only “ERASMUS” academics) 
grow up as Europeans in a wholly natural 
sort of way. The difference is that the 
achievements of European integration are 
not a daily subject for rejoicing. The nega-
tive image of the EU is due primarily to a 
general dissatisfaction with politics and 
what are seen to be insufficient opportuni-
ties for political participation. Why should 
one give one’s assent to a treaty which 
even the Irish EU commissioner does not 
consider to be worth reading and believes 
to be incomprehensible?  
 
Second, the “Yes” camp must finally get 
its campaigning act together. Here again a 
glance at the results of the post-
referendum surveys in Ireland proves to 
be illuminating. The main reason for the 
Irish rejection was not criticism of what 
was actually in the treaty, but a lack of 
knowledge, information and insight. Both 
among the “Yes” voters, the “No” voters 
and those who did not vote at all there was 
and there is a large majority of people who 
are convinced that it is in Ireland’s best 
interests to be part of the EU. However, 
moving from general approval of the EU to 
specific approval of a political project such 
as the Treaty of Lisbon calls for more than 
new communication campaigns funded by 
European institutions. 
 
In the referendums in France, the Nether-
lands and Ireland emotional reasons had a 
decisive influence on the results. The 
campaigns of the opponents of the consti-
tution and the treaty were snappier and 
funnier than those of the supporters. And 
finally, the virtual campaigns in the inter-
net were closely interlinked. Once one had 
stumbled across a website critical of the 
EU there were numerous links to other 
websites with content of a similar kind. In 
Europe, so it seems, people have begun to 
grasp the Obama grassroots technique of 
an internet election campaign. And the 
critics of the EU are particularly good at 
this game. 
 
Third, the political handling of the “No” 
vote could become an example of how to 
conduct European debates in future. After 
the initial shock, the official reaction on 
the national and European levels was 
staunch and level-headed. An important 
signal to the other EU member states was 
the fact that the treaty was actually rati-
fied as planned in the United Kingdom, of 
all places. 
 
The past few months in Ireland have 
shown that the electorate is certainly in-
terested in an intensive debate on Europe. 
Instead of the usual shamefaced and intel-
lectual approval of a complex treaty, Irish 
politicians first began to support Europe in 
a pro-active and emotional manner when 
the multi-millionaire Ganley appeared on 
the scene with his organization LIBERTAS. 
After the referendum in particular there  
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was a lively debate in Ireland about the 
pros and cons of EU membership and the 
further deepening of the EU. In the final 
analysis it remains to be seen whether or 
not this discussion will secure electoral 
approval of the Treaty of Lisbon. But it was 
only the recognition of what would happen 
to Ireland if it no longer had EU member-
ship which made many people (including 
many politicians) aware of the significance 
of the European Union, and this is borne 
out by the survey results. 
 
Fourth, there should be greater involve-
ment in EU policymaking by the national 
parliaments, and Europe should become a 
career vehicle. The Treaty of Lisbon hopes 
to achieve the former with the help of the 
early warning mechanism, which gives the 
national parliaments a greater opportunity 
to play a part in shaping European poli-
tics. 
“The European Union 
needs a new ‘story line’.” 
Furthermore, the report of the Sub-
committee of the Irish parliament suggests 
that national parliaments should be con-
sulted formally about the European Com-
mission’s annual policy strategy and legis-
lative work programmes. However, such 
formal regulations would not change any-
thing about the fundamental deficits of na-
tional policymakers, which include pro-
found ignorance of and a lack of interest 
in European politics. 
 
The EU heads of state and government 
should take this as their starting point. Far 
more effective than any kind of political 
education is to begin with the basic in-
stinct of every politician, which is the ac-
quisition and the retention of power. If in 
future every new national government 
were to include several MEPs and Euro-
pean policy specialists from the national 
parliaments, there would be a rapid in-
crease in the interest displayed in Euro-
pean politics. That could also be a lesson 
from the referendums, albeit an indirect 
one, which might prove useful in the 
forthcoming elections.  
 
Fifth, the European Union needs a new 
“story line,” something that brings to-
gether old values and the challenges that 
lie ahead. The referendum debates have 
demonstrated that the emotional gap that 
separates citizens from Brussels and the 
EU cannot be diminished merely with the 
help of rational techniques. A “Europe of 
projects”, which José Barroso announced 
some years ago, is not an idea that will go 
very far. “Europe as a peace project” 
seems to have become part of the general 
vocabulary, but as something with which 
one can identify this term is no longer of 
much use.  
 
Oddly enough, the global financial and 
nascent global economic crisis could prove 
to be the catalyst for a new idea for the 
European Union. A “Europe of Solidarity” 
may well materialize. There could be in-
ternal solidarity among its citizens and ex-
ternal solidarity with emerging and devel-
oping countries. However, could is the op-
erative word here, for at the moment we 
are still immersed in a crisis. 
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